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THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 
A PRIME ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT 
By John W. Gojman-:-
We hear a great deal about environmental awareness today 
and about the critical need to do something about our deteriorat-
ing environment. Strange indeed, therefore, how rare it is to hear 
environmentalists concern themselves about a major environ-
mental hazard, one that has obviously been with us for a quarter 
of a century, growing steadily during every year of that period. 
I refer, of course, to the existence of nuclear weapons and other 
strategic armaments. It should require no documentation to 
assert that the use of strategic nuclear arms will undo in a great 
hurry all the efforts to eliminate some environmental pollutants; 
and in fact make further efforts of this sort of little consequence. 
Why, then, are nuclear weapons hardly even mentioned as one 
of the environmental issues? 
I am not referring to the testing of nuclear weapons, concerning 
which some environmental issues have been raised from time to 
time, but rather to the existence of these weapons. The standard 
answer to this question would be, in effect, that nuclear weapons 
are not a threat to the environment; they exist merely for the 
purpose of deterring nuclear war. As this myth goes, an ade-
quate arsenal of nuclear armaments represents man's greatest 
contribution to a livable environment, for, by deterring nuclear 
war, these arms prevent the worst conceivable environmental 
destruction. Probably a fair share of those active in the "en-
vironmental movement" buy this mythology-hook, line, and 
sinker. Indeed, conservation groups and ecology groups can 
surely boast among their active members scientists whose voca-
tion is the construction and development of nuclear arms. 
There may be some who will say, "Why bring up nuclear arms 
in relation to environmental problems; they are separate issues." 
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I should like to take exception to that view. They are not sep-
arate issues. More than that, it appears to me that so long as the 
existence of nuclear or other strategic arms is countenanced, 
nothing of consequence is ever going to be accomplished in the 
so-called environmental movement. There is a fundamental in-
consistency in the position that nuclear armaments are neces-
sary and that one is also endeavoring to preserve a livable en-
vironment. 
WHY NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST 
It was stated above that it is a myth that nuclear weapons 
exist to deter nuclear war. If such weapons were truly a deterrent, 
we would not have witnessed a steadily escalating nuclear arms-
missile buildup in the past two decades, even at an accelerating 
rate in the past few years. Of course none of the participants in 
the nuclear arms race will admit to its populace that it has any-
thing but deterrence in mind. This is obvious perfidy. If deterrence 
really were the objective, the arms race participants could long 
ago have agreed to limit nuclear stockpiles to fewer than 50 
nuclear missiles each, with total openness for reassurance pur-
poses. There is no doubt that 50 deliverable nuclear missiles 
would deter any rational power group. Nothing would deter an 
irrational power group, by definition. For anyone to claim that 
a sincere effort has been made to eliminate nuclear arms or to 
deescalate the nuclear arms race is to be naive in the extreme. 
Governments will, of course, insist, for public consumption pur-
poses, that there is nothing dearer to their hearts than total 
nuclear disarmament, but, alas, well-intentioned as "we" are, 
"they" leave us no choice but to continue the nuclear arms race-
only for deterrence of "them." 
The US of course insists on being the "we" who are 
threatened by nuclear blackmail and/or nuclear obliteration by 
"them" (the USSR up to now, with other possible burgeoning 
candidates in the future). 
The USSR agrees with this assessment, except that it is the 
USSR which represents the "we". 
It would be an exercise in futility to attempt to decide which 
"side" is less truthful. What is of far greater relevance is that 
both the US and USSR are quite willing to continue this game of 
roulette in which the populace of both countries (and possibly 
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many other countries) are hostages; at stake are their lives and 
the lives of their descendants. 
The way this "game" is played, and it takes at least two to 
play it, is for each side to start with the premise that the "other" 
side is seeking an opportunity to develop a first-strike capability 
(meaning serious retaliation is impossible). Once that "other" 
side has such a first-strike capability, either it will be used in a 
"final solution" or it will be exhibited with a demand for total 
surrender, i.e. nuclear blackmail. Having adopted this premise, 
the next step is to assume that the appropriate response is a mas-
sive technical effort to develop a nuclear arsenal which prevents 
the "other side" from achieving such a first-strike capability. This, 
of course, means an arsenal capable of assuring massive destruc-
tion (so-called "assured" destruction) of the other side if "they" 
should ever contemplate launching a nuclear war. Now, es-
pionage of various forms, including the sophisticated recon-
naissance satellites, improves steadily, but it is always short of 
perfection. Therefore, it is difficult at any moment for the tech-
nical establishment of one side to know with complete reas-
surance just how advanced the "other" side is toward develop-
ment of a first-strike capability. The inevitable answer, so long 
as technical solutions are sought, is to develop a good "cushion" 
-that is a good deal more than just what might be anticipated 
to guarantee "assured" destruction. So a step upward in escala-
tion of the arms race occurs. 
The "other" side, already convinced that its implacable enemy 
was seeking a first-strike in any event, views this step-up in 
escalation with grave forebodings. They consider it folly in the 
extreme to believe that all that is being sought is assured de-
struction. So they mount an even greater effort of their own to 
offset the recent escalation, all the time reassuring their own 
populace that it is only an effort on their part to avoid becoming 
the victims of nuclear blackmail or a first-strike attack. 
This see-saw has been going on for a couple of decades between 
the US and the USSR. That nuclear war has not occurred in two 
decades is hardly to be taken as re-assurance, for two major 
reasons. 
First, with every step in escalation there has occurred a short-
ening in the response-time available. Decision-making has been 
steadily passing out of the hands of humans and into the ma-
NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT THREAT 785 
chinery of radars, satellites, and computers. Indeed, we com-
monly hear now that one side may not, in a "crisis," even be 
able to wait for proof that attack has been launched; rather, 
pre-emptive attack will be required if it appears that nuclear war 
is "inevitable." It would be hard to stretch one's imagination to 
say that any human reason or judgment countenances any part 
of this "game." If that stretch is possible, one can say, with 
the existing and increasing hair-trigger features, that no residual 
human reasoning or decision-making will be left. 
Second, we may regard the "technicians" who conduct this 
whole affair on both sides, as hard-working individuals, dedicated 
to their work. Imagine the strain on their psyche and emotional 
structure of always wondering if that next technical break-
through may be made by the "other" side, not by them. Many 
sleepless nights, no doubt. Mr. Joseph Alsop, the newspaper 
columnist, appears to be a prominent liaison between the US 
technical establishment and the public. He states explicitly that 
he has many sleepless nights over this issue. One might conjec-
ture that for every hole in the ground dug by the Soviet Union, 
Mr. Alsop loses one or two full nights of sleep. And in his column 
in the San Francisco Chronicle (Oct. 27, 1971) he estimates that 
the Russians had dug more than 95 holes between January and 
September of this year. 
What does this lead up to? Simply this-the longer this game 
is played, the greater is the likelihood that the technical estab-
lishment on either side will hope for a technical breakthrough 
that will permit a final solution to the problem, namely liquida-
tion of the other side. And one side may achieve such a technical 
breakthrough, or think it has, and put it into effect, which means 
nuclear attack. One must note here that it does not really matter 
whether those on one side really have achieved this technical 
breakthrough, only that they think they have. 
Thus, the outlook for avoiding nuclear war seems very poor 
with an escalating, increasingly machine-controlled nuclear arms 
race-and it is becoming poorer all the time. 
WHO WANTS ALL THIS 
The nuclear arms race is said to have a momentum all its own. 
Momentum it has, but not all its own. Some humans are very 
definitely behind it all. The history of the human species thus far 
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has been that some humans have sought privilege, and more im-
portantly, once having achieved privilege, they have sought 
diligently to increase it at the expense of other humans. The 
proper role of the bulk of the human species has been to be servile 
before the privilege-extenders, to thank them for the "oppor-
tunity" to work for them, and to be grateful for the glorious op-
portunity to die for them. The irony of the situation is that the 
privilege-extenders are so effective with the alternate use of 
carrot and stick that the bulk of the species is not only servile but 
also eager to outdo the lemmings. And this is no different in so-
called capitalist or communist countries, and no different no 
matter what the songs, the catechisms, or the many brilliant 
colors of the flag. 
The current nuclear arms race goes on because privilege ex-
tenders in the US or USSR (only the currency of privilege differs 
between these two) see no difference in their current efforts to 
extend privilege from those which have gone on for centuries or 
millennia. It must be regarded as axiomatic that the privilege-
extenders of both sides believe they can achieve their usual goals 
by nuclear blackmail and/or nuclear war. On each side there is a 
ready and willing technical establishment, both military and 
scientific, which carefully nurtures the view that this can be ac-
complished. To be sure, on each side there are profuse explana-
tions that "we" would love nothing better than to end the arms 
race, since peace is "our" sole objective. The insincerity of the 
privilege-extenders on both sides is self-evident. If there were a 
shred of sincerity on either side, they would long ago have taken 
many steps to stop the entire affair. For example, they would 
have acted on nuclear disarmament, instead of talking about it 
while torpedoing any possibility of success in such efforts. And 
one side or the other would have assigned at least 10% of their 
"defense" dollars (or rubles) to put the finest talent to work to 
develop an effective method for coexistence and for total nuclear 
disarmament. It is not possible to believe that such talent would 
fail to work out a suitable operational plan for defusing all the 
armaments. Further, they would have initiated the broadest 
possible dialogue in both countries, with extensive interchange, 
concerning the hazard, the criminali ty and the nonsense of con-
tinuing the nuclear arms race. Instead they continue the arms 
escalation, pay lip service to arms limitation, and continue the 
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cold war psychology in both countries. One can only conclude 
that the privilege-extenders see nuclear armaments and nuclear 
war as a viable method of seeking privilege extension. 
WHERE WILL IT END 
It is possible that the privilege extenders may come to realize 
that the game they play is more of a hazard to their privilege 
than they wish to accept. They may come to realize that even 
they might be vaporized, or if they survive nuclear war, that their 
privilege domain might become indistinguishable from rocks and 
miscellaneous debris. Having for centuries felt that privilege con-
fers immunity from the vicissitudes which plague ordinary hu-
mans, the privilege-extenders are not likely to change their be-
havior, but it is possible they might. 
There is a separate, very cogent dynamic which operates 
against the privilege-extenders' being willing to give up the 
cherished "foreign enemy." The "evil capitalists" are terribly 
useful to the Soviet privilege elite; the "implacable Godless Com-
munists" are similarly useful to the US privilege elite. The real 
danger is that, with the elimination of the threat of foreign devils, 
the internal relationship between privilege extension and environ-
mental deterioration, between privilege extension and con-
sumerist production, and between privilege extension and pollu-
tion will become too evident. This would be highly undesirable, 
indeed perhaps more dangerous than risking nuclear war. 
It is interesting to observe the inability of the environmental 
movement to perceive the dominant threat represented by nu-
clear armaments and the escalating arms race. Part of this is, 
of course, that the environmental movement, in its early phases, 
represented a highly co-opted affair, useful as a diversion from 
such serious problems as Indo-China. The phase of picking up 
beer cans, recycling bottles was delightful and was generously 
applauded, even sponsored by the corporate polluters. But as 
the environmental awareness grew, the sources of environmental 
deterioration and pollution became more evident-and more 
evidently related to privilege extension. And this accounts for 
the end of the honeymoon recently. The privilege-extenders are 
not pleased that an en vironmen tall y aware public: is beginning to 
question growth of senseless, useless production; raising serious 
objections to being made guinea pigs for a totally unproved 
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nuclear electricity technology; and beginning to expect something 
more than shabbiness or poison in their consumer products. So 
we hear more and more of the backlash to the ecology-environ-
mental movement. Perhaps it is favorable that the lines are being 
drawn more sharply now. Maybe the picture of the relationship 
of environmental deterioration, nuclear and other militarism, 
and privilege extension will sharpen up considerably and lead to 
the requisite steps beyond the beer can crusade. 
SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE RECENT AMCHITKA TEST 
A great deal of public interest in nuclear weapons development 
was sparked by the Cannikin test which took place in the Aleu-
tian Islands on November 6, 1971. It is fortunate that no im-
mediate major adverse environmental effects were noted. It will 
be a long time, if ever, before we know the true environmental 
consequences of that test. 
It may come as a surprise to have the statement made that, 
whatever the environmental consequences are of this test, they 
are minor compared with the meaning of the test itself. This 
test represents a major step in the escalation of the arms race. 
As is known, this test is part of the ABM development program, 
a program which by itself means a large dangerous inflammatory 
step in the nuclear arms race. And this, in turn, means that 
major nuclear war is a large step closer. This is the real reason 
people should have been disturbed about Amchitka. Whatever 
fine words are issued about deterring nuclear war or about "bar-
gaining chips," there is only one interpretation of the develop-
ment of an ABM system and that is as part of a program of 
development of a first strike capability, either for use in a nu-
clear attack or for nuclear blackmail. Even if one were to accept 
as sincere the idea that the U.S. is not seeking a first strike ca-
pability, the USSR has no choice but to interpret this as a step 
toward a first strike by the United States. One has only to be 
peripherally familiar with innumerable statements by US of-
ficials and newspaper columnists to the effect that the Soviet 
Union is seeking a first strike capability every time a new hole is 
dug in the ground there to see how the US interprets their actions. 
One can criticize the US Atomic Energy Commission, the De-
partment of Defense, or the President for having gone ahead 
with this inflammatory, escalatory step toward nuclear oblivion. 
But that misses the real problem. And that problem is that the 
I 
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US public has been thoroughly brainwashed by our priviledge 
elite into believing that nuclear arms are needed for national 
security, for deterring nuclear war. And recent polls show that 
more than 75% of US citizens consider nuclear weapons as es-
sential for national security. The US Congress perceives this as 
the dominant view, and they are therefore in no way constrained 
from voting ever-increasing funds for an acceleration in the 
march to doomsday. It is totally inconsistent to be opposed to the 
Amchitka test and to be in favor of nuclear weapons for so-called 
defense purposes. 
Unless the realization spreads that technical answers to se-
curity do not exist, there is little hope. This means worldwide 
realization by a large majority of the population that technical 
strategic weapons development can only lead to utilization of 
such weapons. 
So long as the privilege-extenders believe their goals can be 
achieved by military means, the nuclear (and other strategic) 
arms race will escalate further. There is little point in believing 
that diplomats or governments are going to do anything other 
than what the privilege-extenders prescribe. So, disarmament 
talks by diplomats and militarists can be expected to accom-
plish precisely what they have accomplished in the past-nothing. 
Let us review those ostensible diplomatic achievements for "peace 
in our time." 
Before 1963, increasing world-wide concern about the biolog-
ical harzard of radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear 
weapons tests led the diplomats to the realization that some way 
oflulling the public to sleep was essential. Thus, once the super-
powers had assured themselves that they could learn everything 
they wished to by underground testing of nuclear weapons, they 
magnanimously signed a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests 
in the atmosphere. And, in that treaty, they specifically agreed 
to take steps toward total nuclear disarmament. The public 
broadly assumed the nuclear threat was receding. Public con-
cern vanished, to all intents and purposes. Yet, nuclear weapons 
testing by the US and USSR increased steadily thereafter, 
underground (out of sight). Both superpowers accelerated their 
deployment of nuclear arms and missiles in an astronomical 
manner. This was hardly consistent with their promise to seek 
total nuclear disarmament. 
Before 1968, increasing concern was voiced about the spread 
790 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
of nuclear weapons to more and more countries. So, with fanfare, 
a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. Again, the 
signatories agreed to take serious steps toward nuclear disarma-
ment. What actually happened was a major escalation in the 
nuclear arms race, with the superpowers going ahead to develop 
and deploy ABM and MIRV systems at a feverish pace. These 
two systems are widely regarded as the most dangerous inflam-
matory steps in the nuclear arms race. 
And most recently we have the SALT talks and the "spirit of 
detente and negotiation." At the same time the US speeds for-
ward with ABM development and MIRV deployment. The 
argument given is that we must escalate in order to have some-
thing worthwhile to agree to give up at SALT-the "bargaining 
chip" concept. The USSR simultaneously continues its own es-
calation, with acceleration of nuclear submarine construction and 
increased installation of large, land-based nuclear missiles. Pre-
sumably this represents their "bargaining chips." So much for 
all the diplomatic efforts. But there can be no doubt of one major 
success of all these diplomatic maneuvers: the public was no 
longer totally deceived as to the hazard of nuclear confrontation. 
Right now three-quarters of people in the US appear to favor 
maintenance of a strong nuclear arsenal and to keep up the 
technological effort to develop an even stronger strategic ar-
senal. The public has, without doubt, bought the myth of tech-
nical deterrence to nuclear war. What needs to occur is a major 
reversal in this belief, on the part of people in the US, the USSR, 
and elsewhere in the world. Obviously, the majority of people, at 
least in the US, can see no way for peaceful co-existence with-
out a massive nuclear bludgeon at the ready. Somehow, they 
hope, the bludgeon will deter, even if the evidence suggests other-
wise. What is surprising is that there is no insistence that a major 
allocation of funds and talents be made to a serious persistent 
worldwide effort to develop alternative solutions. What a sad 
evaluation of human ability it is to assume it is not more worth-
while to spend as much on a rational alternative as on nuclear 
escalation. There is, of course, every reason to expect that privi-
lege-extenders in all the super-powers will not assist in such an 
effort, so long as they continue to believe nuclear arms can 
achieve their goals. 
The recent Amchitka test had the effect of at least a little 
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rekindling of public concern about the escalating arms race. Un-
fortunately the public energy went into concern over possible 
environmental hazards of the test, rather than into concern over 
the meaning of Amchitka in arms escalation. Unless this changes, 
the Amchitka blast will be one of the recorded (if records per-
sist) milestones on the road to nuclear oblivion . 
.... _>-.-<-+ .. 
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